United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Beckley Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
C. BERGER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Court has reviewed the Petitioner's August 1, 2016
Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2241 for Miscalculation of Sentence
(Document 1), brought on the grounds, inter alia,
that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly denied him credit
for time served between his arrest and his sentencing.
Standing Order (Document 3) entered on August 1,
2016, this action was referred to the Honorable Dwane L.
Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to
this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendation
for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. On July 5,
2019, the Magistrate Judge submitted a Proposed Findings
and Recommendation (Document 18) wherein it is
recommended that this Court grant the Petitioner's motion
and direct the BOP to recalculate the Petitioner's
sentence. Objections to the Magistrate Judge's
Proposed Findings and Recommendation were due by
July 22, 2019. The Respondent, D.L. Young, Warden, submitted
timely Objections to Proposed Findings and
Recommendations (Document 19). For the reasons stated
herein, the Court finds that the objections should be
Petitioner, Anthony McCoy, was serving a four-year term of
supervised release when he left a halfway house on February
13, 1999. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia
issued an arrest warrant charging him with murder on February
17, 1999. A petition to revoke his supervised release,
alleging that he violated the conditions of supervised
release by leaving the halfway house and failing drug tests,
was submitted on March 26, 1999, and the D.C. District Court
issued an arrest warrant for the supervised release
violations on April 1, 1999. The Petitioner was arrested on
both warrants on April 24, 1999.
D.C. District Court revoked his supervised release and
sentenced him to a 36-month term of imprisonment on August
10, 1999. His sentence computation used an initial date of
August 10, 1999, the date the sentence was imposed, and
credited Mr. McCoy for 108 days of prior custody for the time
spent in custody between his arrest and his revocation
sentencing date. His revocation sentence was satisfied on
December 3, 2001.
December 19, 2000, Mr. McCoy was sentenced in the D.C.
Superior Court on four counts. As to Count C, Possession of a
Firearm During a Crime of Violence, the court imposed a
sentence of 5-15 years, to run concurrent to any other
sentences, and as to Count D, Carrying a Pistol Without a
License, imposed a sentence of 20 months to 5 years to run
consecutive to any other sentence. As to Count E, Possession
of an Unregistered Firearm, the court imposed a sentence of 1
year to run concurrent to any other sentence, and as to Count
F, Possession of Unregistered Ammunition, imposed a sentence
of 1 year to run concurrent to any other sentence. Finally,
as to Count G, Voluntary Manslaughter, the court imposed a
sentence of 15 years to life, to run consecutive to any other
sentence. The BOP used a sentence commencement date of
December 3, 2001, the date Mr. McCoy satisfied the revocation
sentence, and applied no prior custody credit. The total time
calculated prior to his parole eligibility date is 16 years,
eight months, based on the sentences for Counts D and G,
which were ordered to run consecutive to all other sentences.
Court “shall make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, the Court is not
required to review, under a de novo or any other
standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate
judge as to those portions of the findings or recommendation
to which no objections are addressed. Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). In addition, this Court need not
conduct a de novo review when a party “makes
general and conclusory objections that do not direct the
Court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v.
Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
Judge Tinsley found that the sentences that were imposed to
run concurrent to all other sentences should have commenced
on the sentencing date, and that the Petitioner was entitled
to credit for the time spent in pre-sentence custody,
beginning on the date of his arrest on April 24, 1999. The
Respondent argues that the sentences imposed to run
concurrent to all other sentences “were totally
absorbed by the consecutive 5-year and Life sentences,
” and therefore do not impact the calculated sentence
commencement date or total term of imprisonment. (Obj. at 3.)
The Respondent further contends that the Petitioner is not
entitled to prior custody credit for the time between his
arrest and his sentencing because “that time was
credited against his parole violator term” and cannot
properly be credited to more than one sentence. (Id.
the PF&R correctly found that the sentences ordered to
run concurrent should run concurrent with the revocation
sentence, rather than beginning after that sentence was fully
satisfied, those sentences did not increase the total period
of imprisonment and played no role in the time calculations.
The consecutive sentences properly commenced after the
Petitioner's revocation sentence was satisfied, and the
Petitioner's parole eligibility date and total term were
based entirely on those consecutive sentences. Thus, any
error in the treatment of the Petitioner's concurrent
sentences has no impact on the time calculation.
the Petitioner seeks credit for time served between his
arrest and the imposition of the new offense sentences. As
both the PF&R and the Respondent note, prior custody
credit generally cannot be applied to a federal sentence if
it has already been credited to another sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S.
329, 334 (1992). Mr. McCoy's D.C. Code sentences are not
subject to § 3585(b), however. D.C. Code provides that
“Every person shall be given credit on the maximum and
the minimum term of imprisonment for time spent in
custody…as a result of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed.” D.C. Code §24-221.03. Mr.
McCoy was arrested and detained on warrants for both the
supervised release violation and the new criminal conduct.
The time in custody prior to sentencing was credited only to
the revocation sentence. The D.C. Court of Appeals addressed
a similar issue in Ali v. D.C., 612 A.2d 228, 229
(D.C. 1992). The court concluded that, where a person was
detained on valid warrants for both new criminal conduct and
a parole violation, the pre-sentencing time in detention
could properly be credited, under D.C. Code, to only one
sentence. It was ...