Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Meadows v. United States

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Beckley

April 17, 2019

DESABE LOUIS MEADOWS, JR., Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          John T. Copenhaver, Jr. Senior United States District Judge

         Pending is the movant's Emergency Motion to Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed on June 14, 2016, by his counsel, the Federal Public Defender who was then Christian M. Capece.

         This action was previously referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to the court of his Proposed Findings and Recommendation (“PF&R”) for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On November 30, 2018, the magistrate judge entered his PF&R recommending that the motion be granted, and the movant's judgment in the above-cited criminal action be vacated and set aside. The United States timely filed objections on December 14, 2018, to which the movant replied on December 19, 2018.

         Upon an objection, the court reviews a PF&R de novo. Specifically, “[t]he Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to ‘make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge's] report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)).

         I. Background

         On April 3, 2007, the movant pled guilty in the above-cited criminal action to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which carried a maximum sentence of ten years in prison and a maximum term of supervised release of three years. At sentencing, the court found that the movant had committed at least three prior violent felonies, thus meeting the statutory criteria of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), subjecting him to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, and a maximum term of supervised release of five years. Specifically, as set forth in the indictment, the movant previously committed the following offenses:

a. Convicted on or about April 22, 1986, in the Court of Common Pleas Cuyahoga County, Ohio, of felonious assault, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11; robbery in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.02; and breaking and entering in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.13; and
b. Convicted on or about February 17, 1993, in the Court of Common Pleas Cuyahoga Court, Ohio, of felonious assault, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11.

Indictment, ECF # 1 at 1.

         The movant was sentenced to serve 180 months in prison followed by a five-year term of supervised release. The movant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Meadows, 319 Fed.Appx. 204, 205 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 556 U.S. 1203 (2009).

         Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson II”)[1], in which the Court found the residual clause of the ACCA to be unconstitutionally vague, the movant filed the instant motion arguing that he no longer qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal. Specifically, he argues that without the residual clause, the definition of “violent felony” no longer covers at least three of his prior convictions. The magistrate judge agreed, finding in his PF&R that: (1) movant's 1986 robbery conviction is a violent felony; but (2) movant's 1986 and 1993 felonious assault convictions are not violent felonies.[2] The United States objects to the latter finding; no objection was made to the first.

         II. Discussion

         The ACCA defines “violent felony” at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) as follows:

         (B) The term “crime of violence” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.