United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia
WILLIAM H. DAVIS, Petitioner,
DEWAYNE HENDRIX, Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY
PRESTON BAILEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
day, the above-styled matter came before this Court for
consideration of pro se petitioner William H.
Davis' Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 [Doc. 1]. On October 26, 2018, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24]. This
matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that
follow, this Court will grant the respondent's Motion and
dismiss the petition.
12, 2014, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio sentenced petitioner to a term of 63
months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised
release for cocaine trafficking. Petitioner is currently
incarcerated at FCI Morgantown with a projected release date
of April 10, 2019.
13, 2018, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking this Court to
extend the amount of time that he will spend in a Residential
Reentry Center (“RRC”), commonly known as a
“halfway house.” Petitioner also asks this Court
to fine the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).
Specifically, petitioner alleges that the BOP is
“systematically discriminating against inmates and
abusing [its] discretion” with regard to RRC placement.
September 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge James P. Mazzone
conducted a preliminary review of the petition and found that
summary dismissal of the same was not warranted [Doc. 14].
Therefore, respondent was ordered to show cause why the writ
should not be granted. In response, the respondent filed his
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24]. In sum,
the Motion argues the following:
[Petitioner] has received the full extent of any and all
relief to which he is entitled because the BOP decided
whether, and for how long, to transfer [petitioner] to a
halfway house based upon an individualized and thorough
assessment of his circumstances and needs. Further,
[petitioner] cannot use a habeas petition to circumvent the
BOP's discretion to determine whether, and for how long,
he will be released to a halfway house. Accordingly,
[petitioner's] Petition is inherently moot and this Court
lacks jurisdiction to address his claims. Further,
[petitioner's] petition fails to present a cognizable
[Doc. 25 at 1-2].
Magistrate Judge Mazzone issued a Roseboro Notice
informing the petitioner of his right and obligation to file
a response [Doc. 26]. To date, no response has been filed.
Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue exists “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a
trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Id. at 250.
the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That
is, once the movant has met its burden to show absence of
material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must then
come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating
there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323-25; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
Rule 12(b)(6) ...