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Davis v. Hendrix

United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia

January 30, 2019

WILLIAM H. DAVIS, Petitioner,
v.
DEWAYNE HENDRIX, Respondent.

          ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

          JOHN PRESTON BAILEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On this day, the above-styled matter came before this Court for consideration of pro se petitioner William H. Davis' Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. 1]. On October 26, 2018, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24]. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, this Court will grant the respondent's Motion and dismiss the petition.

         BACKGROUND

         On June 12, 2014, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio sentenced petitioner to a term of 63 months' imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release for cocaine trafficking. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at FCI Morgantown with a projected release date of April 10, 2019.[1]

         On July 13, 2018, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asking this Court to extend the amount of time that he will spend in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC”), commonly known as a “halfway house.” Petitioner also asks this Court to fine the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Specifically, petitioner alleges that the BOP is “systematically discriminating against inmates and abusing [its] discretion” with regard to RRC placement.

         On September 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge James P. Mazzone conducted a preliminary review of the petition and found that summary dismissal of the same was not warranted [Doc. 14]. Therefore, respondent was ordered to show cause why the writ should not be granted. In response, the respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24]. In sum, the Motion argues the following:

[Petitioner] has received the full extent of any and all relief to which he is entitled because the BOP decided whether, and for how long, to transfer [petitioner] to a halfway house based upon an individualized and thorough assessment of his circumstances and needs. Further, [petitioner] cannot use a habeas petition to circumvent the BOP's discretion to determine whether, and for how long, he will be released to a halfway house. Accordingly, [petitioner's] Petition is inherently moot and this Court lacks jurisdiction to address his claims. Further, [petitioner's] petition fails to present a cognizable legal claim.

[Doc. 25 at 1-2].

         Subsequently, Magistrate Judge Mazzone issued a Roseboro Notice informing the petitioner of his right and obligation to file a response [Doc. 26]. To date, no response has been filed.

         STANDARDS OF REVIEW

         I. Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

         Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, the Court must conduct “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.

         Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That is, once the movant has met its burden to show absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249 (citations omitted).

         II. Rule 12(b)(6) ...


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