United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia, Clarksburg
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY
IN FELONY CASE
MICHAEL JOHN ALOI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge
by the District Court for purposes of conducting proceedings
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (ECF. No.
164). Defendant, Kamesha Sherrail Claypool, in person and by
counsel, Jeff Harris, appeared before me on April 11, 2018.
The Government appeared by Assistant United States Attorney,
Traci M. Cook. The Court determined that Defendant was
prepared to enter a plea of "Guilty" to Counts
Twenty Four and Twenty Five of the Indictment.
Court proceeded with the Rule 11 proceeding by first placing
Defendant under oath and inquiring into Defendant's
competency. The Court determined Defendant was competent to
proceed with the Rule 11 plea hearing and cautioned and
examined Defendant under oath concerning all matters
mentioned in Rule 11.
Court next inquired of Defendant concerning her understanding
of her right to have an Article III Judge hear the entry of
her guilty plea and her understanding of the difference
between an Article III Judge and a Magistrate Judge.
Defendant thereafter stated in open court that she
voluntarily waived her right to have an Article III Judge
hear her plea and voluntarily consented to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge hearing her plea. Defendant tendered to the
Court a written Waiver of Article III Judge and Consent to
Enter Guilty Plea before Magistrate Judge. The waiver and
consent was signed by Defendant, countersigned by
Defendant's counsel, and concurred by the signature of
the Assistant United States Attorney.
consideration of the sworn testimony of Defendant, as well as
the representations of her counsel and the representations of
the Government, the Court finds that the oral and written
waiver of an Article III Judge and consent to enter a guilty
plea before a Magistrate Judge was freely and voluntarily
given. Additionally, the Court finds that the written waiver
and consent was freely and voluntarily executed by Defendant
Kamesha Sherrail Claypool only after having had her rights
fully explained to her and having a full understanding of
those rights through consultation with her counsel, as well
as through questioning by the Court. The Court
ORDERED the written Waiver and Consent to
Enter Guilty Plea before a Magistrate Judge filed and made
part of the record.
the Court determined that Defendant's plea was pursuant
to a written plea agreement, and asked the Government to
tender the original to the Court. The Court asked counsel for
the Government if the agreement was the sole agreement
offered to Defendant. The Government responded that it was,
and counsel for Defendant confirmed the same. The Court asked
counsel for the Government to summarize the written plea
agreement. Counsel for Defendant and Defendant stated that
the agreement as summarized by counsel for the Government was
correct and complied with their understanding of the
agreement. The undersigned further inquired of Defendant
regarding her understanding of the written plea agreement.
Defendant stated she understood the terms of the written plea
agreement and also stated that it contained the whole of her
agreement with the Government and no promises or
representations were made to her by the Government other than
those terms contained in the written plea agreement. The
Court ORDERED the written plea agreement
filed and made part of the record.
undersigned then reviewed with Defendant Counts Twenty Four
and Twenty Five of the Indictment and the elements the
Government would have to prove, charging her with Aiding and
Abetting the Distribution of Heroin and Aiding and Abetting
the Distribution of a Controlled Substance Analogue
Cycloproplyfentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and Title 18, U.S.C. Section 2.
Subsequently, Defendant Kamesha Sherrail Claypool pled
GUILTY to the charges contained in Counts
Twenty Four and Twenty Five of the Indictment. However,
before accepting Defendant's plea, the undersigned
inquired of Defendant's understanding of the charges
against her, inquired of Defendant's understanding of the
consequences of her pleading guilty to the charges, and
obtained the factual basis for Defendant's plea.
Government proffered a factual basis for the plea. Neither
counsel for Defendant nor Defendant disputed the proffer when
given the opportunity to do so.
stated she heard, understood, and did not disagree with the
Government's proffer. Additionally, Defendant provided a
factual basis for the commission of the offense. The
undersigned Magistrate Judge concludes the offenses charged
in Counts Twenty Four and Twenty Five of the Indictment is
supported by an independent basis in fact concerning each of
the essential elements of such offense, and that independent
basis is provided by the Government's proffer.
undersigned then reviewed with Defendant the statutory
penalties applicable to an individual adjudicated guilty of
the felony charges contained in Counts Twenty Four and Twenty
Five of the Indictment and the impact of the sentencing
guidelines on sentencing in general. From said review, the
undersigned Magistrate Judge determined Defendant understood
the nature of the charges pending against her and that the
possible statutory maximum sentence which could be imposed
upon her conviction or adjudication of guilty on Count Twenty
Four was imprisonment of not more than twenty (20) years. The
undersigned further determined Defendant understood a fine of
not more than $1, 000, 000.00 could be imposed, both fine and
imprisonment could be imposed, and she would be subject to a
period of at least three (3) years of supervised release.
Defendant further understood that the possible statutory
maximum sentence which could be imposed upon her conviction
or adjudication of guilty on Count Twenty Five was
imprisonment of not more than twenty (20) years, a fine of
not more than $1, 000, 000.00 and a term of three (3) years
supervised release. The undersigned further determined
Defendant understood that the Court would impose a special
mandatory assessment of $100.00 per felony conviction payable
within forty (40) days following entry of her plea. Defendant
also understood that her sentence could be increased if she
had a prior firearm offense, violent felony conviction, or
prior drug conviction. She also understood she might be
required by the Court to pay the costs of her incarceration,
supervision, and probation.
undersigned also informed Defendant whether she understood
that by pleading guilty she was forfeiting other rights such
as right to vote, right to serve on a jury, and the right to
legally possess a firearm.
the undersigned asked Defendant whether she understood that
if she were not a citizen of the United States, by pleading
guilty to a felony charge she would be subject to deportation
at the conclusion of any sentence; that she would be denied
future entry into the United States; and that she would be
denied citizenship if she ever applied for it. Defendant
stated that she understood.
undersigned also reviewed with Defendant her waiver of
appellate and collateral attack rights. Defendant understood
that she was waiving her right to appeal her conviction and
sentence to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on any ground
whatsoever, including those grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742. Defendant further understood that under her plea
agreement, she was waiving her right to challenge her
conviction and sentence in any post-conviction proceeding,
including any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Defendant understood, however, that she was reserving the
right to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or
prosecutorial misconduct that she learned about after the
plea hearing and agreed that she was unaware of any
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct
in her case at this time. From the foregoing, the undersigned
determined that Defendant understood her appellate rights and
knowingly gave up those rights pursuant to the conditions
contained in the written plea agreement.
undersigned Magistrate Judge further examined Defendant
relative to her knowledgeable and voluntary execution of the
written plea agreement, and determined the entry into said
written plea agreement ...