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Tabb v. Jefferson County Commission

Supreme Court of West Virginia

March 23, 2018

David C. Tabb, Plaintiff Below, Petitioner
v.
Jefferson County Commission, sitting as the Board of Equalization and Review; Jane Tabb, in her official capacity; Patsy Noland, in her official capacity; Josh Compton, in his official capacity; Caleb Hudson, in his official capacity, et al Defendants Below, Respondents CASE/EXHIBIT NUMBER MOTION AGAINST WHOM DIRECTED SUMMARY

          Jefferson County CC-19-2016-AA-2

          Order Prepared by: Respondents County Commission of Jefferson County, et.al. By Counsel:

          Nathan Cochran Office of the Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney

          Nathan P. Cochran Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

          MEMORANDUM DECISION

         Petitioner David C. Tabb, pro se, appeals four orders of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. In the first order, entered April 20, 2016, the circuit court denied petitioner's appeal of the assessments of his real property for the 2016 tax year. In the second and third orders, both entered December 30, 2016, the circuit court denied petitioner's motion to amend his appeal of the 2016 tax assessments and his motion to alter or amend the court's April 20, 2016, order denying that appeal. In the fourth order, entered December 30, 2016, the circuit court granted respondents' motion for sanctions by limiting petitioner's right to initiate a legal proceeding to those instances where petitioner gives advance notice to the prospective opposing parties and obtains the court's approval for the proceeding or initiates the proceeding through a West Virginia attorney who certifies, pursuant to Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, that the proceeding is neither frivolous nor meant to harass. Respondents Jefferson County Commission, sitting as the Board of Equalization and Review; Jane Tabb, in her official capacity; Patsy Noland, in her official capacity; Josh Compton, in his official capacity; Caleb Hudson, in his official capacity, et al. (collectively "the county commission"), by counsel Nathan P. Cochran, filed a response.[1]Petitioner filed a reply.

         The Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's orders is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

         Petitioner lives and owns real property in Jefferson County, West Virginia. For the 2016 tax year, the Assessor of Jefferson County assessed values for three parcels owned by petitioner: $76, 200 for parcel 1 on Map 2, $289, 000 for parcel 8 on Map 10, and $44, 000 for parcel 8.4 on Map 10. Petitioner appealed these assessments to the county commission. However, at a February 16, 2016, hearing before the county commission, petitioner failed to present any evidence supporting a reduction in the assessments. Rather than presenting his evidence, petitioner requested that all members of the county commission recuse themselves from hearing his appeal because of ongoing litigation between petitioner and the commission. One commissioner was absent, and one commissioner recused herself. But, the other three commissioners denied petitioner's motion for their recusal. As a result, petitioner informed the county commission that he would be "wasting" his time if he presented his evidence and walked out of the hearing. Thereafter, the three county commissioners who did not recuse themselves voted to uphold the three assessments given petitioner's failure to present any evidence that the assessments were wrong.

         On March 16, 2016, petitioner appealed the county commission's decision upholding the assessments. Attached to the appeal were certified copies of the orders entered by the county commission with regard to the three parcels. The certified record did not include documents petitioner left with the county commission's secretary during the hearing given that they were never admitted into evidence because petitioner did not request their admission before walking out of the hearing. Accordingly, in an April 20, 2016, order denying petitioner's appeal, the circuit court found that it legally could not rule in petitioner's favor because the record was devoid of any evidence that the assessments were wrong.

         On April 26, 2016, the county commission filed a motion for sanctions against petitioner. The county commission invoked both Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure and the circuit court's inherent power to ask that the court limit petitioner's right as a pro se litigant to initiate any "new actions or appeals in any court, other tribunal, commission, or administrative agency." In its motion, the county commission alleged that petitioner had a pattern of engaging in serious litigation misconduct over the course of seven proceedings since 2009. Petitioner subsequently filed a response to the motion for sanctions on May 9, 2016. The county commission filed a reply to the response on May 24, 2016.

         On April 27, 2016, petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend the April 20, 2016, order denying his appeal. Finally, on June 30, 2016, petitioner filed a motion to amend his appeal to add the claim that one of the commissioners was morally unfit to hold office on February 16, 2016, [2]when the county commission voted to uphold the tax assessments.

          Accordingly, the circuit court entered three orders on December 30, 2016. First, the circuit court denied petitioner's motion to amend his appeal to add the claim that one of the commissioners was morally unfit to hold office. The circuit court found that the claim was time-barred pursuant to West Virginia Code § 11-3-25(a), which gives the taxpayer thirty days to appeal the county commission's decision, and that the claim did not relate back to any previous claim because it was a new allegation not based on any facts asserted in petitioner's appeal. Next, the circuit court denied the motion to alter or amend the April 20, 2016, order denying the appeal, reiterating that it legally could not rule in petitioner's favor because the record was devoid of any evidence that the tax assessments were wrong.

         Finally, in its third December 30, 2016, order, the circuit court found that a sufficient basis existed, given petitioner's misconduct in this and six prior proceedings, to limit his right as a pro se litigant to initiate any "new civil or administrative actions or appeals in any court, commission, administrative body, agency[, ] or other tribunal." The circuit court ordered that, before petitioner initiates a new proceeding, he must give advance notice to the prospective opposing parties and obtain the court's approval for the proceeding or initiate the proceeding through a West Virginia attorney who certifies, pursuant to Rule 11, that the proceeding is neither frivolous nor meant to harass.

         Petitioner now appeals the various orders entered by the circuit court on April 20, 2016, and December 30, 2016. In syllabus point one of In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation's Woodlands Retirement Community, 223 W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008), we held that circuit court orders are reviewed under the following standard:

"This Court reviews the circuit court's final order and ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo." Syllabus point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996).
On appeal, [3] petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying his appeal of the tax assessments, in denying his motions to amend the appeal and to alter or amend judgment, and in limiting his right to proceed as a pro se litigant. The county commission counters that the circuit court's orders should be affirmed. We agree with the county commission.

         We first address the denial of petitioner's motion to amend his appeal. Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[l]eave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but the action of a trial court in refusing to grant leave to amend a pleading will not be regarded as reversible error in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the trial court's discretion[.]" Syl. Pt. 4, Bowyer v. Wyckoff, 238 W.Va. 446, 796 S.E.2d 233 (2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the circuit court found that petitioner's new claim was time-barred pursuant to West Virginia Code § 11-3-25(a), which gives the taxpayer only thirty days to appeal the county commission's decision. In Tax Assessment Against Purple Turtle, LLC v. Gooden, 223 W.Va. 755, 762, 679 S.E.2d 587, 594 (2009), we reiterated that the thirty-day deadline for filing an appeal from a decision upholding a tax assessment is a "mandatory statutory jurisdictional requirement[ ]." (footnote omitted). Based on our review of the record, we concur with the circuit court's finding that the claim set forth in the motion to amend did not relate back to any previous claim given that it was a new allegation not based on any facts asserted in petitioner's appeal. See Syl. Pt. 7, Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994) (holding that an amendment will not relate back to the original pleading pursuant to Rule 15 if it is based on different facts than those previously alleged), modified on other grounds, Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W.Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d 554 (1997). Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to amend his appeal.

         Next, we address together the denials of petitioner's appeal and his motion to alter or amend judgment. See Syl. Pt. 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998) (holding that the denial of a motion to alter or amend judgment is reviewed under the same standard as the underlying judgment). In syllabus point 5 of Foster Foundation, we held that "[a] taxpayer challenging an assessor's tax assessment must prove by clear and convincing evidence that such tax assessment is erroneous." 223 W.Va. at 16, 672 S.E.2d at 152.

         In Foster Foundation, we rejected arguments similar to ones that petitioner raises here in holding that West Virginia Code § 11-3-24, "which establishes the procedure by which a county commission sits as a board of equalization and review and decides taxpayers' challenges to their property tax assessments, is facially constitutional." 223 W.Va. at 16, 672 S.E.2d at 152, syl. pt. 4. In Mountain America, LLC v. Huffman, 224 W.Va. 669, 683, 687 S.E.2d 768, 782 (2009), we rejected an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the same statutory procedure including the contention that the taxpayer was denied a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal given that "the county commission has appeared as a party litigant adverse to its appeal." We explained that:

[w]hen balancing the circuit court's interest in acquiring necessary information from the [c]ounty [c]ommission regarding its review of tax appeals, with the general due process interests of the taxpayers to be provided an avenue of appeal from a property tax assessment, we do not believe that this procedure necessarily demonstrates a level of bias constituting a deprivation of the Appellant's due process.

Id. at 684, 687 S.E.2d at 783.

         Petitioner's arguments that the county commission was not an impartial tribunal are somewhat broader than those presented in Foster Foundation and Mountain America in that, viewing himself as a concerned citizen, petitioner has been the plaintiff in numerous actions against the county commission regarding such matters as the holding of a special excess levy election and the location of the commission's meeting place.[4] However, in Mountain America, we rejected one of the taxpayer's due process claims because it failed to show that it suffered any prejudice. Id. at 685, 687 S.E.2d at 784. Similarly, we find that petitioner cannot show any prejudice given that his challenge to the tax assessments failed not because of any perceived bias against him on the part of the county commission, but because he chose to walk out of the February 16, 2016, hearing without presenting his case and without moving his documentary evidence into the record. As found by the circuit court, it legally could not rule in petitioner's favor given that the record was devoid of any evidence that the tax assessments were wrong.[5] See Foster Foundation, 223 W.Va. at 16, 672 S.E.2d at 152, syl. pt. 5. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying petitioner's appeal and his motion to alter or amend judgment.[6]

          Finally, we address the December 30, 2016, order imposing sanctions. Petitioner argues that the circuit court lacked the authority to enter such an order because this is a tax assessment appeal rather than a civil action. We disagree. "A court has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction." Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Richmond American Homes of West Virginia, Inc. v. Sanders, 226 W.Va. 103, 697 S.E.2d 139 (2010) (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Shields v. Romine, 122 W.Va. 639, 13 S.E.2d 16 (1940)) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The county commission invoked the circuit court's inherent power and the court found that a sufficient basis existed, given petitioner's misconduct in this and six prior proceedings, to limit his right to initiate various proceedings (defined in the court's order) on his own behalf. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court possessed the inherent power to sanction petitioner in this proceeding.

         Petitioner further argues that the circuit court erred in limiting his right to initiate various proceedings as a pro se litigant without a hearing. "[W]e review imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard." Richmond American Homes, 226 W.Va. at 112, 697 S.E.2d at 148. In syllabus points three and four of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006), we held as follows:

3. "Under West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17, the right of self-representation in civil proceedings is a fundamental right which cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied." Syllabus Point 1, Blair v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984).
4. "The fundamental right of self-representation recognized in West Virginia Constitution art. III, § 17 may not be denied without a clear showing in the record that the pro se litigant is engaging in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice." Syllabus Point 1, Blair v. Maynard, 174 W.Va. 247, 324 S.E.2d 391 (1984).

         In Mathena, the circuit court required a litigant to communicate with the court only through a West Virginia attorney after an implied threat of a "flood" of additional motions in a single letter to the court clerk. Id. at 420-21, 633 S.E.2d at 774-75. We reversed the circuit court's order, finding that the pro se litigant's statement, standing alone, did not provide a sufficient basis to limit his right to proceed on his own behalf. Id. at 424, 633 S.E.2d at 778. However, we did not find that a hearing was necessary, but only that the litigant must be given "an opportunity to show cause why such a limitation should not be imposed." Id. We find that petitioner was provided with such an opportunity because the County Commission put in its motion that it was seeking to limit his right to initiate proceedings as a pro se litigant giving him specific notice of the argument to which he needed to respond in his response.

          Moreover, unlike the limitation imposed in Mathena, the circuit court did not absolutely bar petitioner from acting on his own behalf. Under the circuit court's order, petitioner still may proceed pro se as long as he gives advance notice to the prospective opposing parties and obtains the court's approval for the proceeding. Moreover, having reviewed the December 30, 2016, "Order Granting Motion For Sanctions, " we hereby adopt and incorporate the circuit court's well-reasoned findings and conclusions which we find clearly show that petitioner has engaged in a course of conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the administration of justice (as he did in the instant case by choosing to walk out of the February 16, 2016, hearing). The Clerk is directed to attach a copy of the December 30, 2016, "Order Granting Motion For Sanctions" to this memorandum decision. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in limiting petitioner's right to initiate proceedings on his own behalf as set forth in that order.

         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's April 20, 2016, order denying petitioner's appeal of the assessments of his real property for the 2016 tax year and its three orders, entered December 30, 2016, that (1) denied his motion to amend his appeal of the 2016 tax assessments; (2) denied his motion to alter or amend the April 20, 2016, order denying the appeal; and (3) granted the county commission's motion for sanctions by limiting petitioner's right to initiate a legal proceeding to those instances where petitioner gives advance notice to the prospective opposing parties and obtains the court's approval for the proceeding or initiates the proceeding through a West Virginia attorney who certifies, pursuant to Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, that the proceeding is neither frivolous nor meant to harass.

          CONCURRED IN BY: Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman Justice Robin Jean Davis Justice Menis E. Ketchum Justice Allen H. Loughry II Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

          DAVID C. TABB, Plaintiff, v.

         JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION, JANE TABB, PATSY NOLAND, DALE MANUEL, WALT PELLISH ET AL, Defendants

         Case No. CC-19-2016-AA-2

         ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

         On or about April 26, 2016, the Defendants / Respondents, Jefferson County Commission, sitting as the Board of Review and Equalization, Jane Tabb, in her official capacity, Patsy Noland, in her official capacity, Dale Manuel, in his official capacity, Walt Pellish, in his official capacity, Eric Bell, in his official capacity, and Angie Banks, in her official capacity as the Assessor of Jefferson County, (Commission or Respondents herein) by and through counsel, Nathan P. Cochran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, filed a Motion for Sanctions in this case. Respondents move this Court to find that the Petitioner's Appeal and his Petition for Mandamus are frivolous within the meaning of W.Va.R.Civ.P 11 and extant case law. The Court entered a briefing schedule Pursuant to Trial Court Rule 22 and directed Petitioner to file a Response to the Motion, if desired, within 15 days and Respondents to file a Reply, if desired, within 10 days from the Response. The Matter is now fully briefed and, based on the Motion, Response, Reply, all arguments and proceedings thereon, and the whole record, the Court now makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

         I. FINDINGS OF FACT

         A. Procedural History in This Case

         On the 16th day of February, 2016, the Plaintiff, David C. Tabb, appeared before the Jefferson County Commission, sitting as the Board of Review and Equalization, purportedly to challenge his tax assessment.[1]

However, instead of participating in the hearing, Tabb made a Motion to Recuse and Disqualify the Board, and then failed to present evidence before the Board in the hearing.[2] No evidence was entered by Tabb at the hearing, based on the Board's Orders that Petitioner Tabb filed contemporaneously as exhibits to the Petition (See the Board's Orders filed in the Jefferson County Circuit Clerks efile dated March 16, 2016 and titled "errors of law, attachmnts"(sic)) Tabb did leave some documents with the Board's secretary, however, he did not present the documents as evidence and did not engage in the hearing save to move to disqualify the Board. The Order from the February 16th, 2016 hearing states in part that "Mr. Tabb refused to have the Board of Review and Equalization hear evidence regarding his appeal based upon Motion to Recuse and Disqualify provided to the Assessor on this same date" and that "Mr. Tabb left the room before the Board heard any evidence regarding this appeal of his assessment."

         Based on Tabb's failure to present evidence, the Board found, by vote of 3/0 that Tabb's assessment was not erroneous.[3]

         A. The Motion to Recuse or Disqualify the Board and the Resultant Appeal filed by Tabb is a Device Commonly Employed by Tabb in an Attempt to Intimidate Others and Thereby Influence the Course of Litigation

         In this case, Mr. Tabb attempts to Appeal the decision from the Board of Review and Equalization, even though he entered no evidence into the hearing below. Tabb also concentrates on his allegation that he was or would be treated unfairly by the Board and has moved to recuse the Board for a variety of reasons.[4]

         Taken in isolation, without background, Tabb's appeal could be considered an error of a pro se party that the Court could reject without sanctions. However, the record reveals that claims for recusal or disqualification are common tools utilized by Tabb in an attempt to affect the course of litigation. Consider the following partial list of examples:

CASE/EXHIBIT NUMBER[5]
MOTION
AGAINST WHOM DIRECTED
SUMMARY[6] OF ALLEGED BASIS FOR MOTION

16-AA-2 (This Case)

Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Hon Judge Sanders

Claims prior prejudice.

16-AA-2 (This Case)

Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Jefferson County Commission sitting as a Board of Review

Objects to JCC sitting as BORE.

Mr. Tabb claims apparent bias based on numerous lawsuits and / or complaints that he filed against the Jefferson County Commission and other issues that are too voluminous to list here.

15-AA-4 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 1)

Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Hon. Judge Lorensen

Unclear, seems to not object to Judge Lorensen but does object to his appointment.

15-AA-4

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 2)

Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Jefferson County Commission sitting as a Board of Review

Mr. Tabb claims apparent bias based on numerous lawsuits and / or complaints that he filed against the Jefferson County Commission and other issues that are too voluminous to list here. They are contained in pages 4-8 of the March 18, 2015 Petition for Appeal filed in this case.

15-AA-4

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 3)

Motion to Recuse and Disqualify

Attorney Nathan Cochran

Tabb claimed, pursuant to rule 3.7 of the rules of professional responsibility, that Attorney Cochran should not have argued that this case should have been dismissed without Cochran calling witnesses. However, Tabb disregarded the fact that the Court file contained pleadings prepared and submitted by Tabb (1) (a certificate of service) that proved that Tabb had not properly served the Respondents with original process and (2) (a lack of civil cover sheet) proving that Tabb had failed to file a civil cover sheet with his complaint, both of which deprived the Court of jurisdiction and resulted in dismissal. No witnesses were needed for the Court to view Tabb's own documents that he prepared and submitted to the Court and that were contained in the Court file.

15-AA-4

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 4)

Motion to Disqualify

Hon. Judge Sanders

Judge Sanders continued a hearing and then, when Tabb showed up at the (now continued) hearing Judge Sanders refused to talk about the substance of the case since the Respondent's counsel was not present. A day or two later, Judge Sanders dismissed the case for reasons stated elsewhere in this Motion. This is the

apparent source of Mr. Tabb's recusal motion and other motions in this case.

13-C-432

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 5)

Motion to Disqualify

Judge Sanders

Mr. Tabb had previously moved to disqualify Judge Sanders in case number 13 - C - 205 because Judge Sanders refused to disqualify the prosecuting attorney of Jefferson County, Ralph Lorenzetti, and Assistant prosecutor Stephanie Grove. Also, Judge Sanders did not allow Mr. Tabb to be compensated for legal fees in that case (even though Mr. Tabb had acted pro se in that case, Mr. Tabb had requested to be compensated for legal fees and costs).

13-C-432

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 6)

Motion to Disqualify

Office of the Prosecuting Attorney and all members thereof

Mr. Tabb moved to disqualify or recuse “the office of the prosecuting attorney and all members thereof . . . from participating in this case. . .” because of the “landlord-tenant” and budgetary relationship between the prosecutor's office and the Jefferson County commission.

13-C-432 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 6)

Motion to Disqualify

Assistant Prosecuting attorneys Stephen Groh and Stephanie Grove

Motion to disqualify or recuse assistant prosecuting attorneys Stephen Groh and Stephanie Grove pursuant to rule 3.7 of the rules of professional responsibility because Tabb intended to call them as witnesses and therefore did not believe they could testify as Tabb's witness and also represent the County in the case. This was denied by the circuit court on April 2, 2014.

13-C-432 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 7)

Motion to Disqualify Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with the Judicial Ethics Commission of West Virginia.

Hon. Judge Frye

Mr. Tabb states that he called Judge Frye twice and left two messages but Frye did not call Mr. Tabb back. Tabb then filed a complaint with the judicial investigation committee. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not disqualify Judge Frye.

Also, Judge Frye's alleged continuance or cancellation of a hearing scheduled for June 6, 2014, and Judge Frye's lack of appearance at the cancelled hearing.

In this complaint, Mr. Tabb admits to filing a missing persons request with the West Virginia State Police, requesting their assistance in locating Judge Frye, and notifying the “Prosecuting Attorney's office, Sheriff's Department, West Virginia Supreme Court, Jefferson County Circuit Court, Jefferson County Commission, Governor Tomblin, and Senator Manchin.”

13- C- 205 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 8)

Jefferson County Prosecutor Ralph Lorenzetti and Assistant Prosecutors

Mr. Tabb moved to recuse Mr. Lorenzetti and his subordinates in June of 2013 because Mr. Tabb alleged that the Prosecutors were biased due to the other litigation Mr. Tabb had filed against the County.

13- C- 205 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 9)

Hon. Judge Sanders

Mr. Tabb moved to recuse Judge David Sanders from the case on or about July 7, 2013.

No.: 13-1192 is the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals file on 13- C- 205.

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 10)

Various Justices of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

Mr. Tabb requested that various West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justices recuse themselves (Justices Workman, Benjamin, Ketchum, Davis) on or about February 24, 2014.

11-AA-3 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 11)

Motion to Recuse Judge Sanders

Hon. David Sanders

Alleged Personal Bias

11-AA-3 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 12)

Request the Court find a Conflict of Interest

Jefferson County Prosecutor

Mr. Tabb requested the Court find the Prosecutor had “… A conflict of interest in influencing the Jefferson County commission…”

10-AA-1 (See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 13)

Request the Court find a Conflict of Interest

Jefferson County Prosecutor

Mr. Tabb requested the Court find the Prosecutor had “… A conflict of interest in influencing the Jefferson County commission…”

09-AA-3

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 14)

Request the Court find a Conflict of Interest

Jefferson County Prosecutor

Mr. Tabb requested the Court find the Prosecutor had “… A conflict of interest on influencing the Jefferson County commission…”

09-AA-3

W.Va. Sct. App. pre-hearing # 12-063

(See Documents attached to the Motion for Sanctions as exhibit 15)

Motion to Disqualify

Various Justices of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

Mr. Tabb requested that various West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justices recuse themselves (Justices Workman, Benjamin, Ketchum, Davis). Mr. Tabb alleges that “beginning with the 2008 case and continuing through the above styled matter that the four above-

named justices have engaged in a course of conduct and intentional behavior that your petitioner believes demonstrates at least the appearance of bias if not actual bias against him and which course of conduct and bias violates ….[names numerous judicial canons]

          A. The Underlying Issues in this Case are the Same or Similar Issues Tabb has Previously Presented and Have Been Previously Rejected

         The underlying basis for the tax appeal in this case are many of the same or very similar arguments that Tabb has made in prior tax years which have proven to be unsuccessful. Consequently, Tabb is seeking to advance legal theories that have been previously denied, in similar or identical circumstances, which is the essence of a frivolous lawsuit and appear to be "presented for [an] improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" within the meaning of W.Va. R. Civ. P. 11(b). In the alternative, they are res judicata.

         A. Tabb Has Pursued Many Meritless Suits, Allegations, Claims or Administrative Actions Against the County and County Officials

         Tabb has pursued many allegations, claims or administrative actions against the County and County officials which appear to be "presented for [an] improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" within the meaning of W.Va. R. Civ. P. 11(b). These actions and acts involving the County government and government officials include the following:[7]

1. The instant case for the reasons stated herein.
2. Case 15-AA-4 David and Nadine Tabb v. Jefferson County Commission, sitting as a Board of Review and equalization, and Angie Banks, Assessor of Jefferson County.
a. Mr. Tabb moved for review of his property tax assessment.
b. In this proceeding, Mr. Tabb purports to have moved to disqualify the Circuit Judge, Hon. David Sanders, on or about July 23, 2015, although it remains to be determined ...

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