United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia, Elkins
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PRESTON BAILEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
day, the above-styled matter came before the Court for
consideration of the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Judge
Robert W. Trumble. Pursuant to this Court's Local Rules,
this action was referred to Magistrate Judge Trumble for
submission of a proposed R&R. Magistrate Judge Trumble
filed his R&R on April 27, 2017 [Doc. 8]. In that filing,
the magistrate judge recommended that this Court deny
petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 motion [Doc. 1] and
Motion for Hearing [Doc. 2], and dismiss this action from the
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c), this Court is required to
make a de novo review of those portions of the
magistrate judge's findings to which objection is timely
made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a
de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge as to those portions of
the findings or recommendation to which no objections are
addressed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
In addition, failure to file timely objections constitutes a
waiver of de novo review and the right to
appeal this Court's Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94
(4th Cir. 1984).
objections to Magistrate Judge Trumble's R&R were due
within fourteen (14) days of receipt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petitioner timely filed his objections [Doc.
10] on May 11, 2017. Accordingly, this Court will conduct a
de novo review of the portions of the magistrate
judge's R&R to which the petitioner objects. The
remainder of the R&R will be reviewed for clear error.
February 1, 1999, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina, petitioner was found
guilty on all counts of a six-count indictment that charged
him and two others with: (1) conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) conspiracy
to interfere with commerce by violence; (3) interference with
commerce by violence; (4) attempt to interfere with commerce
by violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951; (5) use of a sawed-off shotgun during a drug
trafficking crime or crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1); and (6) use of a firearm during a crime of
violence and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C.A. §
924(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 [See 1:16-cv-119, Doc. 9-1
at 4, 17; see also United States v.
Scott, 208 F.3d 211, 2000 WL 274966 at *1 (4th
Cir. March 14, 2000)]. On April 19, 1999, petitioner was
sentenced on Count 1 to 405 months' imprisonment; on
Counts 2, 3 and 4 to 240 months' imprisonment to run
concurrently with the sentence in Count 1; on Count 5 to 120
months' imprisonment to be served consecutive to the
sentences on Counts 1-4; and on Count 6 to 240 months'
imprisonment to be served consecutive to the sentences in
Counts 1-5 [See 1:16-cv-119, Doc. 9-1 at 19]. Petitioner
appealed his convictions to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which affirmed his convictions
on all counts on March 14, 2000. Scott, 208 F.3d
211, 2000 WL 274966 at *1. Petitioner filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court which
was denied on November 27, 2000. Truman Scott v. United
States, 121 S.Ct. 563 (2000).
time since his conviction was affirmed, the petitioner has
filed a number of habeas corpus petitions, all of which have
been denied and contain the same or similar allegations
against corrupt law enforcement officers in Robeson County,
States District Judge Terrence W. Boyle of the Eastern
District of North Carolina summarized petitioner's claims
in 2011 by stating:
“Petitioner's claims arise from the federal
prosecution and conviction of law enforcement personnel
following an investigation entitled ‘Operation
Tarnished Badge.' Operation Tarnished Badge was a joint
state and federal investigation of corrupt law enforcement
officers in Robeson County, North Carolina. The investigation
resulted in over twenty (20) federal convictions, including
the conviction of former Robeson County Sheriff Glenn Maynor
and nearly his entire command structure. See United
States v. Maynor, 310 Fed.Appx. 595, 596-98 (4th Cir.
2009). Petitioner alleges officers of the Robeson County
Sheriff's Department ‘fabricated' evidence and
testified falsely against him in retaliation for
Petitioner's refusal to ‘participate in a drug
dealing scheme' with the officers . . .. He seeks relief
on the basis of his allegedly tainted prosecution and
Scott v. United States, 2011 WL 13128265 at *1 (E.D.
N.C., Aug. 2, 2011). Petitioner has repeated many of those
allegations in his pending Petition for Relief filed Under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, and again alleges that officers from the
Robeson County Sheriff's Department fabricated evidence
and again testified falsely against him.
R&R contains a full recitation of the petitioner's
allegations in the instant petition, the same does not bear
repeating here. Petitioner essentially contends that Federal
agents and the prosecution team committed numerous
Brady violations before, during, and after his trial
which render him actually innocent of the crimes for which he
was convicted. Accordingly, he now seeks an order vacating
his conviction and sentence and immediate release from
confinement. In addition, petitioner requests that he be
compensated for the unconstitutional deprivation of his
R&R, Magistrate Judge Trumble recommends that this Court
deny and dismiss the instant Petition [Doc. 1], as it
contains identical issues to those decided by United States
District Judge Irene M. Keeley in 1:16-cv-119. In his
Objections to the R&R, petitioner “urges this
[C]ourt to consider and entertain this application in the
interests of justice, ” and contends that the issues in
the instant petition, “have not been decided on the
merits” [Doc. 10 at 2]. Petitioner does not otherwise
provide an explanation for the exceedingly similar nature of
the two petitions, nor does he detail how, or why, his prior
petition was not dismissed on the merits.
noted in the R&R, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, 28