United States District Court, N.D. West Virginia
WILLIAM C. PUMPHREY, Petitioner,
JOE COAKLEY, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION [DKT. NO. 23], GRANTING RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 12], AND DENYING AND
DISMISSING § 2241 PETITION WITH PREJUDICE [DKT. NO.
M. KEELEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
October 1, 2016, the petitioner, William C. Pumphrey
(“Pumphrey”), filed the pending Petition for
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(“Petition”), contending that the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) unlawfully calculated his
sentence. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and LR PL P 2, the
Court referred the Petition to the Honorable Michael J. Aloi,
United States Magistrate Judge, for initial review. Now
pending for review is the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the
Court deny and dismiss the Petition (Dkt. No. 23). For the
reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R&R.
Petition challenges the BOP's calculation of his sentence
with regard to two separately imposed terms of
incarceration. On August 28, 2009, the United States
Marshals Service (“USMS”) arrested Pumphrey in
Salt Lake City, Utah, in connection with an indictment
returned against him in the District of New Mexico (D.N.M.,
Crim. Action No. 1:09cr01746). On May 5, 2010, Pumphrey
pleaded guilty in the District of New Mexico to one count of
Receipt of Visual Depiction of Minors Engaged in Sexually
Explicit Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2252(a)(2), 2252(B)(1), and 2256 (D.N.M., Crim. Action No.
1:09cr01746, Dkt. No. 43). Thereafter, on January 20, 2011,
the district court sentenced Pumphrey to a 120-month term of
incarceration (D.N.M., Crim. Action No. 1:09cr01746, Dkt. No.
Pumphrey was serving that sentence, a grand jury in the
District of Utah returned an indictment on November 9, 2011,
charging him with additional child pornography offenses (D.
Utah, Crim. Action No. 2:11cr937, Dkt. No. 1). On March 18,
2013, the district court in Utah dismissed that indictment
without prejudice based on a violation of the Speedy Trial
Act (D. Utah, Crim. Action No. 2:11cr937, Dkt. No. 56).
thereafter, on March 27, 2013, another grand jury in the
District of Utah returned an indictment against Pumphrey, and
also a superseding indictment on May 22, 2013 (D. Utah, Crim.
Action No. 2:13cr197, Dkt. Nos. 1; 25). Pumphrey eventually
pleaded guilty to one count of Distribution and Receipt of
Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2252A(a)(2), (b) on June 6, 2013. He waived the preparation
of a presentence report and requested that the district court
sentence him that same day (D. Utah, Crim. Action No.
2:13cr197, Dkt. No. 54). The district court sentenced
Pumphrey to a 120-month term of imprisonment, to run
concurrently with the 120-month term previously imposed in
the District of New Mexico (D. Utah, Crim. Action No.
2:13cr197, Dkt. No. 57 at 1-2). The district court also
recommended to the BOP that Pumphrey receive credit for time
served in connection with the matter, including the related
case that had been dismissed. Id. at 2.
to 18 U.S.C. § 3584, the BOP aggregated Pumphrey's
two sentences into a single term of 12 years, 4 months, and
17 days, finding it began to run when the District of New
Mexico imposed its sentence on January 20, 2011 (Dkt. No.
13-1 at 2). The BOP also gave Pumphrey credit for the time he
spent in official custody prior to that date, including from
August 28, 2009, the date of his arrest on charges in the
District of New Mexico, until January 19, 2011, the day prior
to his sentencing in the District of New Mexico. Assuming
that Pumphrey is eligible to receive good time credit, the
BOP projects he will be released on April 30, 2020.
Id. at 2-3.
argues that the BOP calculated his sentence incorrectly (Dkt.
No. 1 at 6). He contends that, because the District of Utah
intended its sentence to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed by the District of New Mexico, the term of
incarceration imposed in 2013 should have begun on the date
when his term of incarceration in New Mexico was first
imposed in 2011. This would result in a ten-year aggregate
term, rather than the longer twelve-year plus term calculated
by the BOP, and would be further reduced by prior custody
credit from Pumphrey's initial arrest in August 2009.
Based on this, Pumphrey maintains that his sentence would be
fully discharged in 2019. Id. According to the
respondent warden, Joseph Coakley (“Coakley”),
the BOP properly calculated Pumphrey's aggregate term of
imprisonment (Dkt. Nos. 12; 13).
R&R dated May 11, 2017, Magistrate Judge Aloi recommended
that the Court grant Coakley's motion for summary
judgment and dismiss the Petition (Dkt. No. 23). Beginning
with the well-settled principle that a federal sentence
cannot commence earlier than the date on which it is imposed,
he further reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) precludes
the BOP from applying the same prior time credit to more than
one sentence. Id. at 8-9. Therefore, Magistrate
Judge Aloi concluded that, regardless of the District of
Utah's intent, the BOP properly calculated the beginning
of Pumphrey's second 120-month term of incarceration on
June 6, 2013, the date it was imposed, and properly applied
prior custody credit to Pumphrey's aggregate term of
incarceration. Id. at 11. Pumphrey timely objected
to the R&R on May 18, 2017. A discussion of those
STANDARD OF REVIEW
reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636, the Court must review de novo
only those portions of the R&R to which an objection is
timely made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Otherwise,
“the Court may adopt, without explanation, any of the
magistrate judge's recommendations to which the prisoner
does not object.” Dellaciprete v. Gutierrez,
479 F.Supp.2d 600, 603-04 (N.D. W.Va. 2007) (citing Camby
v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983)). Courts
will uphold those portions of a recommendation to which no
objection has been made unless they are “clearly
erroneous.” See Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
argues that the BOP improperly calculated his term of
imprisonment despite the fact that “[p]etitioner's
attorney, the judge, and the A.U.S.A. went to extraordinary
lengths to put on record the intent of the plea agreement
that Petitioner's time was to [be] served concurrent
[sic] with that of New Mexico and that he was to be given
credit for the time he spent in detention in Utah”
(Dkt. No. 25 at 2). “[H]e cannot agree that the BOP has
some power above and beyond a judge's intentions when
sentencing to completely go against said intentions.”
Pumphrey may disagree, Magistrate Judge Aloi fully and fairly
addressed this argument. Even though the District of Utah
ordered its sentence to run concurrently with the sentence
imposed in the District of New Mexico, the District of
Utah's sentence could not begin, and thus could not begin
to run concurrently, until the date it was imposed.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Moreover, because the
BOP is responsible for computing the length of Pumphrey's
sentence, the District of Utah's intent regarding credit
for time served simply is not controlling. Statutory law